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ANTI-MONOPOL Y, INC. v. GENERAL MILLS FUN
GROUP, INC.: ENDING THE MONOPOLY ON
"MONOPOLY"
I. INTRODUCTION
In Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. (4nti-Mo-
nopoly I1),1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trade-
mark registration of MONOPOLY2 for Parker Brothers' popular real
estate board game was invalid because the term had become "ge-
neric."3 This followed an earlier decision by the Ninth Circuit in the
same case Qinti-Monopoly J),4 which set out the basic test to be used to
determine if MONOPOLY was "generic."
These decisions have received criticism from commentators 5 and
trademark lawyers,6 have provoked alarm among trademark owners,7
and have prompted political activity aimed at amending the Lanham
Trademark Act.' This response is due to the court's departure from
1. 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234, reh'g denied, 103 S. Ct.
1805 (1983).
2. This Note uses MONOPOLY to refer to the trademark and "Monopoly" to refer to
the game.
3. 684 F.2d at 1326. The Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976), pro-
vides for cancellation of a registered trademark "at any time if the registered mark becomes
the common descriptive name of an article or substance." 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976). This
is referred to as "genericness" in this Note.
4. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979).
5. 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICES § 2.02(8) (1983); Zeisel, The
Surveys that Broke Monopoly, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 896 (1983); Note, Monopoly, Anti-Monop-
ol:.- The Loss of Trademark Monopolies, 8 COLUM. J. ART & L. 95 (1983); Note, Genericide:
Cancellation ofa Registered Trademark, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 666 (1983).
6. Greenbaum, Ginsburg & Weinberg, A Proposalfor Evaluating Genericism After
"Anti-Monopoly", 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 101 (1983); Hewitt & Krieger, And-Monopoly--An
Autopsyfor Trademarks, 11 AM. PAT. L.A. Q.J. 151 (1983); Barnaby, "Antd-Monopoly" and
the Future of Trademarks in the Ninth Circuit, MERCHANDISING REP., Mar. 1983, at 4; Lef-
kowitz & Graham, Court rules that "Monopoly" has Suffered Genericide, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
7, 1983, at 14; Sammons, The Name ofthe Game, INC., Sept. 1983, at 28; L.A. Daily Journal,
Sept. 12, 1983, at 7, col. 1. Contra Leiser & Schwartz, Techniques/or Ascertaining Whether a
Term is Generic, 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 376 (1983).
7. Barnaby, supra note 6, at 4-5; Lefkowitz & Graham, supra note 6, at 18; Sammons,
supra note 6, at 28-29; L.A. Daily Journal, supra note 6.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R. Utah) first introduced a
bill, S. 1440, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S8136-37 (daily ed. June 9, 1983), which
would have amended 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) by adding:
except that no registration of a mark shall be cancelled on the grounds that such
mark has become a common descriptive name unless it is clear that in the minds of
the consuming public the mark fails to indicate the source or quality of goods or
1021
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traditional trademark law in three areas: (1) the basic test used to de-
termine when a trademark has become "generic;" 9 (2) the public opin-
ion survey evidence which is applied to the basic test;'" and (3) the
effect of genus definition on the selection of survey evidence." I
This Note examines these three areas of departure and concludes
that the approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in these decisions is not
clearly defined and as a result introduces confusion into the "generic-
ness" determination. This Note also offers an alternative way of han-
dling the facts ofAnti-Monopoly I & II that would be more in harmony
with traditional trademark functions and discusses less drastic remedies
the court could have employed to protect the public from confusion
while promoting fair competition.
II. HISTORY OF "MONOPOLY"
The game "Monopoly" developed at some time between 1904 and
1934. From 1920 to 1932 it was played only on a few college campuses
by a small group of individuals.12 In 1931, the game was brought to
Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the street names changed to Atlantic
City street names. Charles Darrow, an unemployed salesman, was
services on which it is used. Purchaser motivation shall not be used to determine
whether a mark is generic.
This was later revised and expanded and introduced by Senator Hatch and thirteen cospon-
sors as bill, S. 1990, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S14,378-83 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1983), which would amend 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) by adding:
except that a registered mark shall not be deemed to be the common descriptive
name of goods or services merely because such mark is also used as a proper name
of or to identify a unique product or service. The primary significance of the regis-
tered mark to the purchasing public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the
test for determining whether the registered mark has become the common descrip-
tive name of goods or services in connection with which it has been used.
Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (R. Wisc.) has also introduced a bill, H.R. 4460,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H10,192 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983), which would
amend 15 U.S.C. § 1064 by adding:
For purposes of subsection (c) of this section, a registered mark shall not be
deemed to be the common descriptive name of a product merely because the mark
is used to identify a unique product or service. The exclusive test for determining
whether a registered trademark has become a common descriptive name shall be
whether a majority of the relevant public understands the trademark to function as
a mark or as a common descriptive name.
A Cabinet Council Working Group on Intellectual Property has been formed which will be
chaired by Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and will con-
sider the necessity for legislative redress to counteract the "mischief' of Anti-Monopoly.
UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASS'N, 38 GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS BULLETIN 21 (1983).
9. See infra notes 68-109 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 110-61 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 161-88 and accompanying text.
12. 684 F.2d at 1320; 611 F.2d at 299.
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taught the game in late 1932 or early 1933 and given a handmade game
board, rules and associated equipment. 13 Immediately thereafter, Dar-
row commenced commercially producing and selling "Monopoly"
game equipment.'
4
In October 1933, Darrow obtained a copyright 15 on the game
rules. Parker Brothers acquired all of Darrow's existing rights to "Mo-
nopoly" in March 1935.16 In August 1935, Darrow applied for a pat-
ent' 7 on "Monopoly" which was issued on December 31, 1935. He
promptly assigned the patent to Parker Brothers.'8 It expired seventeen
years later.' 9
From 1935 to 1952 Parker Brothers relied primarily on its patents
to protect its rights to "Monopoly." After the patents expired, however,
it began to concentrate on preserving the value of its MONOPOLY
trademarks issued July 30, 1935, and September 15, 1936.20 References
to becoming the "monopolist" were eliminated from the game rules2
and the "generic" expression "real estate trading game equipment" was
13. 684 F.2d at 1320; 611 F.2d at 299. Darrow claimed to have invented the game, 684
F.2d at 1320, and is traditionally credited with having done so. L.A. Times, July 31, 1983,
§ 6 (View), at 2, col. 1.
14. 611 F.2d at 299. By late 1934, there had been 17,000 orders and Darrow decided to
take on a professional partner. L.A. Times, supra note 13, at 2, col. 4.
15. Copyrights protect an author's original and fixed expressions from unlawful copying
for a limited time as governed by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). The
Constitution confers on Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re-
spective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
16. 684 F.2d at 1320; 611 F.2d at 299. Parker Brothers also bought an alternate version
called "Finance" from its owners in 1935 and the prior year had purchased a precursor to
"Monopoly," "The Landlords Game," invented by Mrs. Elizabeth Maggie Phillips and pat-
ented by her in 1904 and again in 1924, to fully secure their rights to the game "Monopoly."
684 F.2d at 1320.
17. Patents protect an inventor's new, useful and unobvious inventions from unlawful
use by others for a limited time as governed by the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). The Patent Act arises under the same provision of the Constitution as the
Copyright Act. See supra note 15. The Lanham Trademark Act, however, arises under the
commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, so that trademark registration is designed to
regulate interstate commerce and need not be for a limited time. Cf. United States v. Stef-
fens, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (Trademark Acts of 1870 and 1876 held unconstitutional
when enacted under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
18. 611 F.2d at 299.
19. Id.
20. Id. The And-Monopoly I court incorrectly listed one trademark registration as
number 38,834. Id. The registered trademarks were actually numbered 326,723 and 338,834
respectively. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 448,
450 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q.
634, 636-37 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
21. 611 F.2d at 299.
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created to be used in conjunction with the MONOPOLY trademark on
the game carton and in advertisements.22 Since 1935 Parker Brothers
has sold over 80 million sets of the "Monopoly" game for $125 million
and has spent over $4 million in publicizing the trademark. 3
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1971 Ralph Anspach, an economics professor, created a game
to emphasize and support the values of the competitive private enter-
prise system.24 It was first marketed unsuccessfully under the name
"Bust the Trust" but achieved notable market success when the name
was changed to "Anti-Monopoly." Since first being sold in December
1973, about 419,000 "Anti-Monopoly" games have been sold for close
to $1 million.25 The United States Patent and Trademark Office re-
jected a 1973 trademark application for "Anti-Monopoly" because it
concluded there was a possibility of confusion, mistake or deception.26
This application was not pursued further.
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. (hereinafter Anti-Monopoly), a California
corporation formed to produce and sell the game "Anti-Monopoly,"
sought a declaratory judgment in the Northern District of California27
that, among other things, the trademark MONOPOLY was invalid and
should be cancelled because it was initially or had become "generic.
28
22. Id. These steps were taken "to keep the word MONOPOLY from falling into the
public domain as a 'generic' term." Id. See generally 3 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 18.25 (L. Altman rev. 4th ed. 1983); 1 J. GILSON,
supra note 5, § 2.02(7), (8)(c); 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 12:9 (1973); E. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.20 (2d ed. 1968);
Diamond, Properly Used, Trademarks Are Forever, 68 A.B.A. J. 1575 (1982).
23. 515 F. Supp. at 450; 195 U.S.P.Q. at 637.
24. 611 F.2d at 299-300; 515 F. Supp. at 450; 195 U.S.P.Q. at 636. Anspach evidently set
out to make the game after his son asked him what was wrong with being a monopolist after
they had played a game of "Monopoly." Sammons, supra note 6, at 28.
25. 515 F. Supp. at 450; 195 U.S.P.Q. at 636.
26. 611 F.2d at 300. A trademark may be refused registration if it:
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office or a mark or trade name previously used in the
United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to the
goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ....
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1976).
27. After Parker Brothers threatened suit, Anspach fied suit, locally, in order to keep
expenses down. Sammons, supra note 6, at 28.
28. 195 U.S.P.Q. at 637. In addition, Anti-Monopoly sought a declaratory judgment
that the trademark MONOPOLY was not infringed by its actions and was obtained by
fraud, or the right to use it was acquired by means of a fraudulently obtained patent. Id. A
registered mark which has been in continuous use for five consecutive years subsequent to its
registration, as MONOPOLY had been, is incontestable, 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1976), except if it
"becomes the common descriptive name of an article or substance," 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c)
1024 [Vol. 17
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General Mills Fun Group, Inc. (hereinafter Parker Brothers), the suc-
cessor to Parker Brothers, Inc.,29 counterclaimed seeking a declaratory
judgment of trademark validity and infringement as well as seeking an
injunction precluding the use of "Anti-Monopoly" and destruction of
all materials bearing that name.3 °
IV. REASONING OF THE COURTS
The Anti-Monopoly I district court found3' that the trademark
MONOPOLY, as applied to the real estate board game in question,
was arbitrary and unique, or at most a suggestive title, so that it was
validly registered without the necessity of proof of secondary mean-
ing.32 Arbitrary and fanciful3 3 or suggestive 34 terms are entitled to re-
gistration without a showing that they have acquired a secondary
meaning, while descriptive terms35 require this showing.36 InAnti-Mo-
nopoly I the district court noted that, secondary meaning would attach
"to a word or phrase originally incapable of registration which has nev-
ertheless been used so long and exclusively by a producer with regard
to a product, that the word or phrase has come to mean that the article
is that producer's product. 37
(1976), "the registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained fraudu-
lently," 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(1) (1976), or it comes under other sections not relevant here.
29. Parker Brothers is an unincorporated division of General Mills Fun Group, Inc.
which has since become, by merger and change of name, CPG Products Corp., a subsidiary
of General Mills, Inc. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit at 1 n.1, CPG Prods. Corp v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1234
(1983).
30. 195 U.S.P.Q. at 637. Trademark infringement is defined at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976),
injunctive relief provided for by 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976), and destruction of infringing arti-
cles provided for by 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1976).
3 1. Anti-Monopoly's demand for a jury trial was denied by the district court, Anti-Mo-
nopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 195 U.S.P.Q. 633 (N.D. Cal. 1976), and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on this point. 611 F.2d at 307-08.
32. 195 U.S.P.Q. at 638 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537
F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976)).
33. Arbitrary and fanciful terms have no meaning relative to the products with which
they are used. Zivin, Understanding Generic Words, 63 TRADE-MARK REP. 173, 173 (1973).
Examples are KODAK for cameras and CAMEL for cigarettes. Id.
34. Suggestive terms suggest or imply the characteristics of the products with which they
are used. Id. Examples are BULLDOG for wall hangers and TALON for zippers.
35. Descriptive terms directly convey the characteristics of the product with which they
are used, such as the product's color, order, function, dimensions, properties or ingredients.
Id. at 174. Examples are FORMICA for a plastic laminate used as a substitute for mica and
FEATHERCOMBS for a lightweight hair retainer. Id.
36. 195 U.S.P.Q. at 637-38. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
37. 195 U.S.P.Q. at 637. The Ninth Circuit in affirming a finding that the "pocket tab"
on Levi Strauss blue jeans had acquired secondary meaning defined it as "a mental recogni-
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The district court also found that MONOPOLY was not a "ge-
neric" term because it had not become the common descriptive name
of the article: "The primary significance of MONOPOLY. . .is not
that it describes all board games involving real estate trading but rather
that it is the title of a particular and very popular board game produced
by a single company."3 Thus, MONOPOLY was different from trade-
marks found "generic" in the past. 9
On Anti-Monopoly's appeal of the district court decision, the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court had erred in determining the
"genericness" of the trademark MONOPOLY by failing to differentiate
between two crucial alternative meanings the trademark could have:
(1) "'a particular and very popular board game'" or (2) a game "'pro-
duced by a single company.' "40 The Ninth Circuit was concerned that
"if consumers think of MONOPOLY as a unique game, and differenti-
ate it from all other real estate trading games by source-irrelevant char-
acteristics, . MONOPOLY may constitute its own genus. 41  One
approach to "genericness" has been determining whether a term refers
to a genus like automobiles or a species like CHEVROLET. The
Ninth Circuit held that the district court had short circuited this deter-
mination by presuming the relevant genus to be "'all board games in-
volving real estate trading' "4 2 when it might be "the game played by
the rules of 'Monopoly.' ,41 The Ninth Circuit stated the proper test
for "genericness" as: "Do consumers use the term MONOPOLY pri-
marily to denote the product, or instead to denote its producer? ' 44 This
test, in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, would avoid improper presump-
tions by courts as to the relevant genus by focusing entirely on con-
tion in buyers' and potential buyers' minds that products connected with the symbol or
device emanate from or are associated with the same source." Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue
Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). See also Treece & Stephenson, Another Look at
Descriptive and Generic Terms in American Trademark Law, 66 TRADE-MARK REP. 452, 456-
57 (1976) ("Secondary meaning, as a term of art, describes only a conclusion that a sufficient
number of consumers regard a word as a symbol of source to justify treating it legally as a
symbol of source.").
38. 195 U.S.P.Q. at 638.
39. Id. The court specifically named the "generic" terms, formerly trademarks, cello-
phane, DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 601 (1936), thermos, King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963), and aspirin, Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 195 U.S.P.Q.
at 638.
40. 611 F.2d at 305-06.
41. Id. at 305.
42. Id. (quoting 195 U.S.P.Q. at 638).
43. 611 F.2d at 305.
44. Id.
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sumer understanding.45 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, reversed and
remanded for further findings on the validity and enforceability of the
MONOPOLY trademark consistent with the "proper" test.
46
On remand, theAnti-Monopoly II district court considered further
evidence but again found that MONOPOLY was not a "generic"
term.47 It relied on survey evidence introduced by Parker Brothers that
showed 63% of those polled recognized MONOPOLY as a "brand
name"48 and over 55% correctly identified Parker Brothers as the sole
producer of the game.49  The district court rejected survey evidence,
directed to why consumers buy the game "Monopoly," offered by Anti-
Monopoly because of methodological deficiencies5" and because it
viewed the dispositive issue as "not why consumers buy ['Monopoly']
sets, but rather, what is their understanding of the name MONOP-
OLY?"'' The court also thought a survey directed to why consumers
buy a product would be unfair for a unique product like "Monopoly"
because questions directed to whether a person buys a product for
source-related as opposed to source-irrelevant characteristics5" will
elicit source-related responses only if the person can make a compari-
son with product substitutes, or near substitutes.
5 3
On Anti-Monopoly's appeal of the district courtAnti-Monopoly II
decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's finding that the
trademark MONOPOLY primarily denoted its producer was clearly
erroneous, 54 and that MONOPOLY had become "generic" so that it
45. Id. at 306.
46. Id.
47. 515 F. Supp. at 455. The court received two additional surveys, id. at 453, and the
testimony of four witnesses on the consuming public's perception and usage of the term
MONOPOLY. Id. at 450.
48. Id. at 454.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 453 n.4. The court found this evidence to be inherently biased towards a
favorable outcome for Anti-Monopoly based on its part in choosing the survey language,
overwhelmingly prone to errors of subjective grading and internally inconsistent. Id.
51. Id. at 454 (emphasis in original).
52. Some examples of source-related characteristics are price, style, durability or quality.
Id. Source-irrelevant characteristics would describe some aspect of playing the game, such
as enjoyable, fun, interesting or educational. 684 F.2d at 1324.
53. 515 F. Supp. at 454. Anti-Monopoly's survey showed that of the people who had
purchased "Monopoly" within the last couple of years or were planning to purchase it in the
near future, 82% had bought or would buy it because of some aspect of the game (enjoyable,
fun or interesting), 14% because it was educational, 7% because of some aspect of the equip-
ment (style, durability or quality), and 1% because of price (percentages total more than 100
because some respondents gave more than one reason). 684 F.2d at 1324.
54. 684 F.2d at 1321-22.
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was no longer a valid trademark." The circuit court in reaching its
decision relied on the two surveys offered by Anti-Monopoly which
had been rejected by the district court. The first survey showed that
53% of the people polled were familiar with a business board game in
which players buy, sell, mortgage and trade city streets, utilities and
railroads, build houses, collect rents and win by bankrupting all other
players; of that 53%, 80% would ask for MONOPOLY to buy the
game. 6 The second survey, based in part on a hypothetical situation
suggested in the Ninth CircuitAnti-Monopoly I decision,57 showed that
92% of the people polled were aware of "Monopoly," the business
board game produced by Parker Brothers; of that 92%, 62% had
purchased "Monopoly" within the last couple of years or were plan-
ning to purchase it in the near future; of that 62%, 65% wanted a "Mo-
nopoly" game primarily because they were interested in playing
"Monopoly" and did not much care who made it as opposed to want-
ing a "Monopoly" game primarily because they liked Parker Brothers'
products.58 The Ninth Circuit found no merit in the objections the dis-
trict court had to this survey evidence;59 it held that the first survey was
compelling evidence that those familiar with the game would ask for it
by the name "Monopoly"60 and the second survey was a reasonable
effort to support the conclusion that the purchaser asking for it by that
name was using it in the sense of product.6 The "brand-name" survey
relied upon by the district court was rejected by the Ninth Circuit be-
cause: "Under the survey definition, 'Monopoly' would have to be a
'brand name' because it is made by only one company."
62
55. Id. at 1326.
56. Id. at 1323-24. The court called this the "Thermos" survey because it was based
upon a survey used in American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9
(D. Conn. 1962), af'd sub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577
(2d Cir. 1963), where the trademark THERMOS was found to be "generic." 684 F.2d at
1323.
57. The Ninth Circuit had stated in Anti-Monopoly I:
It may be that when a customer enters a game store and asks for MONOP-
OLY, he means: "I would like Parker Brothers' version of a real estate trading
game, because I like Parker Brothers' products. Thus, I am not interested in board
games made by Anti-Monopoly, or anyone other than Parker Brothers." On the
other hand, the consumer may mean: "I want a 'Monopoly' game. Don't bother
showing me Anti-Monopoly, or EASY MONEY, or backgammon. I am interested
in playing the game of Monopoly. I don't much care who makes it."
611 F.2d at 305-06.
58. 684 F.2d at 1324. The court called this the motivation survey. Id.
59. Id. at 1325-26. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
60. 684 F.2d at 1324.
61. Id. at 1325.
62. Id. at 1323. The people polled were told: "By brand name, I mean a name like
Chevrolet, which is made by one company; by common name, I mean 'automobile,' which is
1028 [Vol. 17
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Thus, in finding the trademark MONOPOLY invalid because it
had become "generic," the Ninth Circuit rejected the commonly used
"brand-name" survey apparently because of "Monopoly's" status as a
unique game made by only one company. Instead the Ninth Circuit
embraced a new type of survey, the results of which purport to show
that purchaser understanding of a product's name is reflected in the
motivation of purchasers in using the name to ask for the product.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Departures from Traditional Trademark Law
The Ninth Circuit, in the two appeals by Anti-Monopoly, departed
from traditional trademark law in three interrelated ways. First, the
court, in a subtle departure from the traditional basic "genericness"
test, moved away from tests giving a large measure of protection to
registered trademarks. 3 The second departure, which created most of
the adverse public reaction,64 was the court's reliance upon the new
"motivation" survey.6" The final and most confusing departure was the
court's definition of the relevant market and its determination that
"Monopoly" constituted its own genus,6 6 which led to the rejection of
Parker Brothers' "brand-name" survey.67 Each of these departures will
be analyzed critically below.
1. The basic test
The primary function of a trademark is the designation of the
source of the goods to which it is affixed rather than the designation of
the goods themselves. 61 Originally this source identification was im-
portant to ensure that a buyer could return to the same manufacturer
from whom he had previously purchased goods in order to purchase
additional goods or to fix the blame for faulty manufacture. The devel-
opment of a highly complex industrialized society with multinational
corporations, distributorships and franchise operations, however, has
resulted in a separation of buyer and manufacturer.69
made by a number of different companies." Id. (emphasis in original). See supra text ac-
companying notes 48-49 for survey results.
63. See infra notes 68-109 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 5-6.
65. See infra notes 121-61 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 162-69, 175-90, and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
68. See 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, § 18.01; 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 2.01; 1 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 12:1; E. VANDENBURGH, supra note 22, § 9.20.
69. See 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 1.03(1).
1984] 1029
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As early as 1927, a commentator argued that source identification
was obsolete and that buyers had come to rely on the trademark as a
guarantee of product quality emanating from a common, though anon-
ymous, source.70 In 1971, the Ninth Circuit expressed agreement with
this viewpoint in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. ,7 an antitrust class ac-
tion suit alleging a tying arrangement violating the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act.72 The court stated:
The historical conception of a trade-mark as a strict em-
blem of source of the product to which it attaches has largely
been abandoned. The burgeoning business of franchising has
made trade-mark licensing a widespread commercial practice
and has resulted in the development of a new rationale for
trade-marks as representations of product quality.7 3
The Lanham Trademark Act (the Act),7 4 in line with the primary
function of trademarks, provides for cancellation of a registered trade-
mark "at any time if the registered mark becomes the common descrip-
tive name of an article or substance. ' 75 The problem is to determine
when a trademark has become the common descriptive name of a
product rather than a guarantee of product quality.
The Act does not provide a precise standard for this determina-
tion;76 the courts have developed a hierarchy of categories that relate to
the trademark registrability of proposed terms. 77 The categories are:
(1) "generic"-cannot become a trademark under any circumstances;
70. Comment, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927). See also Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 528, 528-29 (1980) ("[I]t is the quality function of trademarks that is most important
to the general consuming public."); Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks,
65 TRADE-MARK REP. 318, 319 (1975) ("[I]n the world of modem marketing the primary
function of a trademark is to indicate degree of quality, and only secondarily to indicate
origin or source.").
71. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
73. 448 F.2d at 48. Contra Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of
Trademarks in the Market Place, 64 TRADE-MARK REP. 75, 87-88 (1974) (source indication
function not obsolete but coexistent with quality guarantee function).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1976).
76. See Comment, Generic Term or Trademark?: Confusing Legal Standards and Inade-
quate Protection, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 109, 112-13 (1979).
77. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1976). See
Comment, Generic Term or Trademark?: Confusing Legal Standards and Inadequate Protec-
tion, supra note 76, at 113-14. This hierarchy is based on the registration provisions of the
Lanham Trademark Act which provide that a mark may be refused registration if "when
applied to the goods of the applicant [the mark] is merely descriptive ... of them," 15
U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (1976), but "nothing ... shall prevent the registration of a mark used by
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(2) descriptive-can become a valid trademark if it acquires secondary
meaning as denoting the applicant's goods; (3) suggestive-entitled to
registration without proof of secondary meaning; and (4) arbitrary or
fanciful-entitled to registration without proof of secondary mean-
ing.78 Although these categories aid in determining registrability of
proposed terms, they are often difficult to apply because they are not
entirely distinct. For example, a word may be arbitrary or fanciful
when applied to one product and "generic" when applied to another;
79
more importantly, a term which initially is in one of the registrable
categories may through use become "generic" so that it cannot be regis-
tered, or if it is registered, is no longer valid. 0
The traditional test for determining whether a term in a registrable
category has become "generic" was set out by Judge (later Justice)
Learned Hand in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. :81 "[T]he question is
whether the buyers merely understood that the word 'Aspirin' meant
this kind of drug, or whether it meant that and more than that; i.e., that
it came from the same single, though, if one please anonymous, source
from which they had got it before."82 Thus, the Bayer test looks to the
consumer's understanding of the term at issue and requires that for the
trademark to be valid proponents must show some, although rather
limited, producer significance so that the term does not have only prod-
uct significance.
83
the applicant which -has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1976).
78. 537 F.2d at 9-11; Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co., 601
F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 1979). See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
79. 537 F.2d at 9; Comment, Generic Term or Trademark?" Confusing Legal Standards
and Inadequate Protection, supra note 76, at 114-15. A familiar example is "Ivory," which
would be arbitrary when applied to soap but "generic" when applied to products made from
elephant tusks. 537 F.2d at 9 n.6.
80. 537 F.2d at 9.
81. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
82. Id. at 509.
83. See Comment, Generic Term or Trademark?" Confusing Legal Standards and Inade-
quate Protection,supra note 76, at 117-19. Several courts have interpreted the Bayer test this
way. The most literal interpretation was stated as: "[A] defendant alleging invalidity of a
trademark for genericness must show that to the consuming public as a whole the word has
lost all its trademark significance." Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243, 270 (D.
Mass. 1955) (emphasis in original). The Second Circuit's interpretation was stated as:
[A] mark is not generic merely because it has some significance to the public as an
indication of the nature or class of an article. . . . In order to become generic the
principal significance of the word must be its indication of the nature or class of an
article, rather than an indication of its origin.
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir. 1963) (quoting
Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.) (emphasis in original),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962)). In fact, the Ninth Circuit interpreted it in much this way
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In Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries Co. ,84
a 1979 case, the Ninth Circuit recognized Bayer as the source of the
traditional test but quoted only that portion of Bayer directing atten-
tion to consumer understanding: "'What do the buyers understand by
the word for whose use the parties are contending?' "" Then, the Sur-
gicenters court went on to quote the 1938 United States Supreme Court
decision in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. 86 for what the Ninth
Circuit described as a sharpened "genericness" test: "'[T]o establish a
trade name in the term "shredded wheat" the plaintiff must show more
than a subordinate meaning which applies to it. It must show that the
primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public
is not the product but the producer.' "87 This Kellogg test was applied
by the Ninth Circuit to MONOPOLY in Anti-Monopoly 181 & 11.89
The Kellogg test, unlike the Bayer test, requires that producer sig-
nificance be the primary concern for trademark validity;9" it is a
tougher validity standard for the trademark proponent to meet. This
substantive difference in the two tests can be explained in terms of the
registrability categories discussed earlier.91 In Bayer, the court dealt
in upholding the validity of the trademark DEXEDRINE for dextro-amphetamine sulfate:
"[T]o the extent that the given name is identified in the mind of the consumer with the
source of the product, the name may be protected." Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline &
French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190, 195 (9th Cir. 1953) (footnote omitted).
84. 601 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1979).
85. Id. at 1016 (quoting Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. at 509).
86. 305 U.S. Ill (1938).
87. 601 F.2d at 1016 (quoting Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. at 118).
88. 611 F.2d at 302.
89. 684 F.2d at 1319.
90. 305 U.S. at 120-22.
91. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae, the
United States Trademark Association, in Support of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6
n.6, CPG Prods. Corp. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983). This explanation is
based on an argument that determination of trademark validity should focus solely on likeli-
hood of confusion. Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REv.
967, 977-79 (1952) ("For the law to concern itself with the nature of the word or mark in any
way other than to inquire as to the likelihood of confusion is to place the cart before the
horse." (emphasis in original)). See infra note 206 and accompanying text. One factor con-
sidered in deciding whether there is likelihood of confusion is the strength or weakness of
the marks:
A "strong" mark is one which is used only in a "fictitious, arbitrary and fanciful
manner," see National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195, 199 (9th Cir. 1955),
whereas a "weak" mark is a mark that is a meaningful word in common usage, see
Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1950), or
is merely a suggestive or descriptive trademark, see Majestic Mfg. Co. v. Majestic
Electric Appliance Co., 172 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1949). A "strong" mark is entitled
to a greater degree of protection than is a "weak" one because of its unique usage,
see Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1948).
New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting J.B.
1984] ANTI-MONOPOLY, INC v. GENERAL MILLS 1033
with an arbitrary or fanciful term which had become "generic."92 By
contrast, in Kellogg the Supreme Court considered a descriptive term
which had become "generic," as evidenced by the Court's statement
that "['Shredded Wheat'] is the generic term of the article, which de-
scribes it with a fair degree of accuracy; and is the term by which the
biscuit in pillow-shaped form is generally known by the public."93
The question in all such cases is what the buyer understands the
term to mean now94 and not whether this present understanding differs
either a little or a lot from the initial understanding of the term. There-
fore, although it might be true that it is more difficult for an arbitrary
or fanciful-as opposed to a descriptive-term to become "generic,"
there should still be only one test for "genericness."
The result of the Ninth Circuit's Surgicenters decision is that,
based on an erroneous interpretation of the Kellogg test, the Ninth Cir-
cuit no longer follows the traditional Bayer test to which the Second
Circuit ascribes.95 The language adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Sur-
gicenters as a "genericness" test was intended by the Supreme Court to
be a test for secondary meaning, not a sharpening of the Bayer "gener-
icness" test. The Bayer court considered whether a term functioning as
a registered trademark popularized by and used exclusively by the
Bayer Company96 should be dedicated to the public because it had be-
come "generic' (lost distinctiveness). 97 In Kellogg, on the other hand,
Williams Co. v. LeConte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 192 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 913 (1976)). On this basis, however, MONOPOLY was determined to be a "famous"
mark entitled to broad protection. General Mills Fun Group, Inc. v. Tuxedo Monopoly,
Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 396, 401 (T.T.A.B. 1979), affd, 648 F.2d 1335 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
92. The court stated that "the word is coined and means nothing by itself." 272 F. at
509.
93. 305 U.S. at 116.
94. Even the Ninth Circuit agreed that MONOPOLY was not "generic" at the time it
was registered, 684 F.2d at 132!, but then went on to consider its current status. Id.
95. See supra note 83. Professor McCarthy has argued that "both word formulations
arrive at the same result from different directions: Majority usage of the word is control-
ling." I J. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 12:2C. This argument ignores the Second Circuit's
greater solicitude for registered trademarks, see King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus.,
Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) ("Since the great majority of the public who use the
word 'thermos' are not aware of any trademark significance, there is not enough dual use to
support King-Seeley's claims to monopoly of the word as a trademark." (emphasis added)),
and its use of the Kellogg formulation in traditional secondary meaning situations. See, e.g.,
American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1979).
96. 272 F. at 507-08. Some 20 months after the patent on "Aspirin" expired an examiner
in the Patent Office cancelled the ASPIRIN trademark. Id. at 508.
97. Id. at 509. For a different analysis of the Bayer case, see Swann, The Validity of Dual
Functioning Trademarks: Genericism Tested by Consumer Understanding Rather than by
Consumer Use, 69 TRADE-MARK REP. 357, 359-61 (1979) (ASPIRIN had already fallen into
the public domain during the life of the patent on "Aspirin").
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the term at issue never had been registered as a trademark.98 The Kel-
logg Court noted that the descriptive term "Shredded Wheat" had
been used since 1894 as the "generic" designation for the product. 99
The Court, however, considered, at the plaintiff's insistence, whether
the term had acquired secondary meaning (gained distinctiveness)
which would take it out of the public domain and thereby accord the
plaintiff exclusive rights to the term.' The Kellogg Court reasoned
that because the term "Shredded Wheat" was now "generic," rather
than descriptive, there was "no basis. . . for applying the doctrine of
secondary meaning," since "generic" terms are not registrable under
any circumstances.'' In dicta, the Court stated its producer-signifi-
cance test for secondary meaning'02 and indicated that even if "Shred-
ded Wheat" was descriptive, rather than "generic," it would not meet
the Court's test.10 3 This dicta relating to secondary meaning has be-
come the Ninth Circuit's test for "genericness.''104
A secondary meaning test should be different from a "genericness"
test because they are applied in different situations. Before investing a
descriptive term with enforceable trademark rights the term must ac-
quire a secondary meaning to the extent that itprimarily signifies to the
consumer the producer of the goods. This stringent test ensures that no
terms now in the public domain are easily captured for exclusive use.i 5
98. 305 U.S. at 117.
99. Id. at 116-17.
100. Id. at 118.
101. Id. See infra note 221.
102. See supra text accompanying note 87.
103. 305 U.S. at 118. The Ninth Circuit has cited Kellogg for the secondary meaning test
when considering the descriptive slogan "Use ARRID To Be Sure." Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Hewitt & Krieger, supra
note 6, at 164-65; Treece & Stephenson, supra note 37, at 474-75; Zivin, supra note 33, at
184-86. But see Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 70 TRADE-MARK REP. 206,
211 (1980) (Kellogg test is the most widely accepted modem test of genericness).
104. 611 F.2d at 302; 684 F.2d at 1319. The First Circuit has characterized the Kellogg
test as erroneous dicta that "a generic trademark might be entitled to protection." Miller
Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 7 n.2 (Ist Cir. 1981). See also Zeisel,
supra note 5, at 907.
105. The Second Circuit has stated:
[T]he law strikes the balance, with respect to registration, between the hardships to
a competitor in hampering the use of an appropriate word and those to the owner
who, having invested money and energy to endow a word with the good will ad-
hering to his enterprise, would be deprived of the fruits of his efforts.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976). See also
Beran, Trademark or Mere Unregistrable Matter-Where Do You Draw the Line, 52 TRADE-
MARK REP. 953 (1962) (discussion of registration of descriptive or "weak" marks).
Some courts have stated that a party developing secondary meaning in a descriptive
term should be protected against those who appropriate it with knowledge or good reason to
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On the other hand, in the "genericness" situation, once a term has de-
veloped enforceable trademark rights or been validly registered
through the owner's investment of time and money, a court should be
slow to work a forfeiture of these rights." 6 The tests, therefore, serve
distinct purposes and should not be used interchangeably. 7
In Anti-Monopoly I & 1I, the Ninth Circuit considered a validly
registered trademark. 08 The Bayer test, a test for "genericness,"
should have been applied. The court's use of the Kellogg test, a test for
secondary meaning, resulted in a lesser protection for the owner of the
originally arbitrary and fanciful or suggestive term with respect to
which source indication had developed. Following also from the appli-
cation of the Kellogg test in this situation-one in which the term was
originally arbitrary and fanciful or suggestive and supposedly registra-
ble without a showing of secondary meaning-is the result that owners
face trademark invalidation at any time, in the guise of a "genericness"
challenge, for failure of the mark to have acquired such secondary
meaning. The conclusion inevitably follows that once the trademark
has developed into a symbol of goodwill worth protecting, its very pop-
ularity will motivate competitors to attack its validity and make it more
know of its potential in that regard, or with an intent to capitalize on its connotation of
quality. Emra Corp. v. Superclips Ltd., 559 F. Supp. 705, 714 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Orion
Pictures Co. v. Dell Publishing Co., 471 F. Supp. 392, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Glamorene
Prods. Corp. v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 145, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); National Lam-
poon, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 376 F. Supp. 733, 747 (S.D.N.Y.), a'd, 497 F.2d
1343 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, § 19.27 (favorable view of
protecting developing secondary meaning in these situations); 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5,
§ 2.09. Contra Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg. Co., 684 F.2d 546,
550 (8th Cir. 1982) (protecting secondary meaning developing by virtue of substantial adver-
tising outlay "focuses solely upon the intent and actions of the seller of the product to the
exclusion of the consuming public"); Scagnelli, Dawn of a New Doctrine?-Trademark Pro-
fection/or Incipient Secondary Meaning, 71 TRADE-MARK REP. 527 (1981).
106. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982). See also
Swann, The Economic Approach to Genericism: . Reply to Folsom and Tepy, 70 TRADE-
MARK REP. 243, 250-51 (1980) ("[B]ecause of uncertainties in the principal methods of proof,
the potentially disastrous consequences of trademark loss and other fairness considerations,
doubts as to genericism are currently resolved rather strongly 'in favor of the trademark
owner.'" (footnote and citations omitted)); Note, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered
Trademark, supra note 5, at 691-95 (argument made that requiring a heavier burden of
proof than preponderance of the evidence t6 show "genericness" is appropriate to protect
trademark owners).
107. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals made a similar observation in the context
of an opposition proceeding when it noted: "[T]here are real and logical reasons for protect-
ing the private property in a trademark with a wider moat or a higher fence than is required
to be built around publicly owned descriptive words or phrases." Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1180 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
108. 684 F.2d at 1321.
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susceptible to invalidity for becoming "generic." Therefore, pursuant
to the Ninth Circuit approach, trademark registration would fail to
achieve its purpose of preventing "impairment of the value of the en-
terprise which owns the trademark."' 10 9
2. The survey evidence
In determining "genericness," the consumer's understanding of the
term is at issue. Consequently, public opinion surveys play an impor-
tant evidentiary role.I" Surveys probing the consumer perception of a
term have been admitted by courts with increasing frequency under the
state of mind exception to the hearsay rule."' When properly con-
ducted, a survey can provide an accurate measurement of the level of
consumer understanding that a term enjoys and allow selection of a
relevant universe of prospective purchasers from the general popula-
tion." 2 The validity, or trustworthiness, of a survey generally depends
on three factors: (1) selection of a representative sample of respondents
that can be validly projected to the relevant universe of purchasers or
prospective purchasers;" 3 (2) selection of unbiased and unambiguous
109. 611 F.2d at 300-01. See also Artype, Inc. v. Zappulla, 228 F.2d 695, 697-98 (2d Cir.
1956); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Aetna Auto Fin., Inc., 123 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1941);
Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
110. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 8.11(1); Dutka, The Use of Survey Research in Legal
Proceedings, 68 A.B.A. J. 1508, 1508 (1982); Comment, Generic Term or Trademark? Con-
fusing Legal Standards and Inadequate Protection, supra note 76, at 130-32.
111. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc:, 216 F. Supp. 670, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GROUP ON PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIGATION,
HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES, 25
F.R.D. 351, 427-28 (1960) [hereinafter cited as PROTRACTED CASES-RECOMMENDED PRO-
CEDURES]; 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 8.11(2); Dutka, supra note 109, at 1508; Shryock,
Survey Evidence in Contested Trademark Cases, 57 TRADE-MARK REP. 377, 378 (1967).
112. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 388 (7th Cir. 1976); James
Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 278 (7th Cir. 1976); Dutka, supra
note 110, at 1509-10. For survey evidence to be relevant to the litigation it must be directed
to that segment of the general population which is comprised of prospective purchasers of
the subject product. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 264 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d
655, 661 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1981); Hawley Prods. Co. v. United States
Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 1958); National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Wichita Falls Sportswear, 532 F. Supp. 651, 657-58 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Scotch Whiskey
Ass'n v. Consolidated Distilled Prods., Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. 130, 133 (N.D. In. 1980); Dicta-
phone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 445-46 (D. Or. 1978); American Basket-
ball Ass'n v. AMF Voit, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 981, 986 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boat
Co., 226 F. Supp. 716, 737 (W.D. Mich. 1964); McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Weed
Eater, Inc., 208 U.S.P.Q. 676, 685 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
113. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d at 388; James Burrough Ltd. v.
Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d at 278; PROTRACTED CASES-RECOMMENDED PROCE-
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questions;"14 and (3) administration by qualified and objective inter-
viewers. "5 Employment of an expert to carry out these three functions
who should be required to testify as to the survey methodology and its
relevance to the issues at trial is the most direct way to ensure that the
validity of a survey is described adequately for a court." 6
Trademark owners have come to rely on results of "brand-name"
surveys to refute "genericness" challenges. 17 A brand-name survey
asks people whether a given term is a brand name for a product made
by one company-like CHEVROLET-or a common name for a
product made by a number of different companies-like automobile." 8
This type of survey was accepted by the court considering the validity
of the TEFLON trademark in El du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Yoshida International, Inc. "I InAnti-Monopoly II, however, the Ninth
Circuit held that this type of survey had no relevance where the prod-
uct was made by only one company.12 0
The Ninth Circuit instead adopted as trustworthy two surveys of-
fered by Anti-Monopoly. The first was a survey similar to that adopted
in American Thermos Products Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc. ,i21 where
the court found the trademark THERMOS to be "generic," and the
second was a new kind of survey based in part on a hypothetical situa-
tion suggested by the Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monopoly 1.122 The THER-
MOS-type survey conducted by Anti-Monopoly sought to determine
what term purchasers would use to ask for the game "Monopoly." The
DURES, 25 F.R.D. at 429; Dutka, supra note 110, at 1509-10. The sample size should be large
enough to give statistically valid results and should represent a good cross section of the
relevant universe. General Motors Corp. v. Cadillac Marine & Boat Co., 226 F. Supp. at
737.
114. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. at 684; PROTRACTED CASES-
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES, 25 F.R.D. at 429; Dutka, supra note 110, at 1510.
115. See supra note 113.
116. PROTRACTED CASES-RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES, 25 F.R.D. at 429; Dutka,
supra note 110, at 1510; Comment, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence. The Pollsters Go to
Court, 66 HARV. L. REV. 498, 506-08 (1953). See generally 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5,
§ 8.11(3); Bonynge, Trademark Surveys and Techniques and Their Use in Litigation, 52
TRADE-MARK REP. 363 (1962); Kunin, The Structure and Uses of Survey Evidence in Trade-
mark Cases, 67 TRADE-MARK REP. 97 (1977); Sorenson & Sorenson, The Admissibility and
Use of Opinion Research Evidence, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213 (1953).
117. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 2.02(8)(a)', Note, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered
Trademark, supra note 5, at 668-69.
118. 684 F.2d at 1323. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
119. 393 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
120. 684 F.2d at 1323.
121. 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn. 1962), affidsub nom. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
122. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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survey described the game in some detail and then asked the purchas-
ers what they would call the product just described,' 23 just as purchas-
ers in the American Thermos case had been asked what term they
would use to identify a container that keeps liquids hot or cold for a
period of time.'24 The second survey, which the Ninth Circuit called a
motivation survey, sought to determine whether individuals were moti-
vated to buy "Monopoly" because of their interest in playing the game
or because of their admiration for Parker Brothers' products .125
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on these two surveys as evidence con-
cerns trademark owners who believe that most trademarks would fail
to survive a motivation survey.' 26 This concern results from the fact
that Parker Brothers offered evidence in the Anti-Monopol II district
court of a motivation survey that showed 68% of consumers polled
would buy Proctor and Gamble's TIDE primarily because they liked
that detergent and not because they liked Proctor and Gamble's prod-
ucts. 2 7 The Ninth Circuit replied that "Proctor and Gamble might
have cause for alarm"'' 28 if the reasoning of And-Monopoly I could be
extended to detergents. The fears of trademark owners may be un-
founded, however, because the rejection of brand-name surveys ap-
pears to be limited to the unique product situation, 29 as will be
discussed below, 30 and the motivation survey may not be accepted in
other circuits.'
3 '
Additionally, these fears may be unfounded because it appears the
123. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
124. 207 F. Supp. at 21-22 & n.8.
125. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 7.
127. 684 F.2d at 1326. The Ninth Circuit noted that this evidence "was intended as a
reductio ad absurdum of the motivation survey." Id.
128. Id.
129. The Ninth Circuit's TIDE comment was made with the suspicion that consumers
consider "'Tide' as the name of a particular detergent, having particular qualities, rather
than as one producer's name for the same detergent which is available from a variety of
sources." .1d.
130. See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
131. The Ninth Circuit'sAnti-Monop II reasoning was indirectly castigated as an "eso-
teric and extraneous inquiry focusing on what motivates the purchasing public to buy partic-
ular goods, the product itself or the source." In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1054
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., especially concurring). The decision in DC Comics was handed
down on September 30, 1982, the last day before the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals became the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, estab-
lished by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The new court indicated, in the
first appeal heard, that it would consider the holdings of its predecessor courts as binding
precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (C.A.F.C. 1982) (en bane).
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results of a motivation survey alone will not result in a finding of
"genericness." The Ninth Circuit accepted that based on the results of
the THERMOS-type survey, 32 "an overwhelming proportion of those
who are familiar with the game would ask for it by the name [MO-
NOPOLY]."'' 33 The court then considered "the sense in which a pur-
chaser used the word [MONOPOLY] when asking for the game by that
name" 34 and concluded MONOPOLY was used primarily in a prod-
uct sense.' 35 This second determination was the result of the motiva-
tion survey.' 36 Since this second determination in Anti-Monopoly II
necessarily depended on the court's interpretation of the THERMOS-
type survey results, it can be said that the Ninth Circuit used a two-step
analysis in order to determine whether the term MONOPOLY was
"generic."
The Ninth Circuit's use of a THERMOS-type survey places a pre-
mium on the existence of other terms a consumer can use to refer to the
product described. Thus, if the product description is drawn narrowly
enough it will elicit identification of only one manufacturer's product.
The issue consequently becomes whether the public has accepted the
''generic" term selected by the manufacturer to refer to the product or
has come to use the trademark for this purpose. To this extent, the
THERMOS-type survey is highly susceptible to manipulation. For ex-
ample, in the case of "Monopoly," given "that people tend to adopt
and use the shortest and simplest word which will adequately commu-
nicate the idea or call to mind the object or product that they want to
tell about,"' 37 it was fairly easy to construct a THERMOS-type survey
that described only the game "Monopoly" and the results were bound
to show the public would use MONOPOLY rather than "real estate
trading game equipment"' 138 to refer to the game. In contrast, to find
TIDE "generic" based on the results of the motivation survey offered
by Parker Brothers it would first be necessary to construct a THER-
MOS-type survey which would elicit TIDE as a major response to:
"What would you call a product which is added to the washer to aid in
cleaning clothes?" This would be difficult because TIDE is protected
by its competitors' trademarks and the widely recognized "generic"
term, laundry detergent.
132. 684 F.2d at 1323-24.
133. Id. at 1324.
134. Id. at 1325.
135. Id. at 1326.
136. Id. at 1324-26.
137. American Thermos Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. at 20.
138. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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A factor important for courts to consider, which theAnti-Monopoly
II opinion failed to consider, is the trustworthiness of a THERMOS-
type survey in light of its susceptibility to manipulation. Thus, in order
to make fair decisions as to the weight to give such a survey, courts
should require, as a preliminary matter, a showing that the product
description used in the THERMOS-type survey is such that products
the trademarked product actually competes with in commerce are nec-
essarily covered by the question asked.' 39 This would avoid the unfair-
ness of penalizing the trademark owner for a lack of competitors unless
he is exerting an unfair monopoly over the product market but would
still place the burden of existence of an accepted "generic" term on the
trademark owner who has some control over this factor in packaging
and advertising. 40
Motivation surveys are also susceptible to manipulation.' 4 ' In
Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc. ,42 a motivation survey conducted
by the trademark owner was offered into evidence which gave consum-
ers a choice of:
A. I buy TOLL HOUSE morsels because I believe I need
that brand to bake TOLL HOUSE chocolate chip cookies. I
care who makes them and I rely on the TOLL HOUSE trade-
mark for quality.
B. I buy TOLL HOUSE morsels because I need them to
bake chocolate chip cookies. I don't care who makes them
and I don't rely on the TOLL HOUSE trademark for
quality.
43
The court rejected this survey on procedural grounds; 44 however, the
court discussed survey trustworthiness in a manner that indicated it
would have evaluated such a party-designed survey rigorously. The
court stated:
The trustworthiness of surveys depends upon foundation
evidence that (1) the 'universe' was properly defined, (2) a
representative sample of that universe was selected, (3) the
questions to be asked of interviewees were framed in a clear,
precise and non-leading manner, (4) sound interview proce-
139. See infra notes 179-90 and accompanying text. See also Zeisel, supra note 5, at 900-
01.
140. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
141. See supra text accompanying note 137.
142. 571 F. Supp. 763 (D. Conn. 1983).
143. Id. at 772.
144. d. at 772-73.
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dures were followed by competent interviewers who had no
knowledge of the litigation or the purpose for which the sur-
vey was conducted, (5) the data gathered was accurately re-
ported, (6) the data was analyzed in accordance with accepted
statistical principles and (7) objectivity of the entire process
was assured. Failure to satisfy one or more of these criteria
may lead to exclusion of the survey. .... 14-
The court thus excluded a survey where the questioning was conducted
personally by the expert after being contacted by the lawyers for one
party on the grounds that such contact cast "sufficient doubt on the
essential objectivity of the survey."'146 The Nestle court also accorded
less weight to surveys conducted in response to the lawsuit. 4 7
The Nestle Company by including "product quality guarantee"
language in its motivation survey achieved favorable results when ap-
proximately 74% of the people polled selected the response that indi-
cated quality was a factor in their motivation to purchase TOLL
HOUSE morsels. 14' The Anti-Monopoly 1I motivation survey was in-
tended to reveal the consumer's motivation for using the term MO-
NOPOLY.149 As it was phrased, however, it revealed the consumer's
motivation for buying the product "Monopoly." These examples make
it clear that widespread application of motivation surveys could result
in the introduction of extraneous biases into "genericness" determina-
tions because the "reason the public is motivated to buy the product,
whether because of quality, particular features, source, pleasing design,
association with other goods, price, durability, taste, or prestige of own-
ership, is of concern to market researchers but is legally immaterial to
the issue of whether a particular designation is generic."' 0 Consumers
can be presumed to purchase products primarily because they desire
the functional aspects of the product and perhaps secondarily because
145. Id. at 774 (quoting Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp.
1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
146. 571 F. Supp. at 775.
147. Id. at 776. The trademark TOLL HOUSE performed well on a THERMOS-type
survey and a brand-name survey, id. at 776-77, but the court was most impressed by inverted
THERMOS-type surveys where people primarily responded with the "generic" term "choc-
olate chip cookies" when asked what TOLL HOUSE meant to them. Id. at 770. An in-
verted THERMOS-type survey reveals what product market the trademark is in, but does
not distinguish between a response which means "chocolate chip cookies in general" rather
than "chocolate chip cookies made by a specific company."
148. Id. at 772.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
150. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d at 1054; 515 F. Supp. at 454.
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they like the producer. 5' This fact, however, should not serve to inval-
idate the product's trademark if the trademark is still functioning to
allow purchasers who are motivated by identity of the producer or by
quality guarantees to distinguish between similar products on these ba-
ses. In short, a motivation survey, particularly when it is designed by
an interested party, can be designed to evoke one purchase motivation
over another without ever illuminating what purchase information the
trademark is communicating to the purchaser.'52
Professor McCarthy has noted that courts demonstrate two ten-
dencies when considering survey evidence: "[A] survey is accepted and
relied upon when the judge already ha[s] his mind made up in favor of
the survey results; and a survey is rejected and torn apart when the
judge subjectively disagrees with the survey results."'153 That the Anti-
Monopoly II court engaged in such result-oriented analysis cannot be
doubted. In rejecting the brand-name survey, the Ninth Circuit stated:
"[O]n cross-examination and redirect examination it became clear that
this witness had done no more than reduplicate the 'Teflon' survey
(with appropriate substitutions and slight additions) and had no opin-
ion on the relevance of this survey to any issue in the present case.
When it affirmed the validity of the THERMOS-type survey, however,
the court stated: "The witness . . . testified that Anti-Monopoly gave
his firm the questions used in the 'Thermos' survey and asked it to
conduct a similar one. . . . The witness gave no testimony as to the
relevance of the results of the survey to the issues in the case."''  The
court apparently did not rely on any expert interpretation of the survey
evidence it considered.
The Anti-Monopoly II court accepted the THERMOS-type survey
without questioning its trustworthiness after noting that "Anti-Monop-
oly provided the wording of the questions"' 56 and the motivation sur-
vey after noting that "[t]he wording of the questions was provided by
Dr. Anspach, Anti-Monopoly's president, and by the expert who testi-
151. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942);
Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 146 (1920); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d at
1054; 515 F. Supp. at 454.
152. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text. See also Zeisel, supra note 5, at 903-
05.
153. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 32:55. See also Comment, Opinion Surveys as
Evidence.: The Pollsters Go to Court, supra note 116, at 506 ("The use of expert testimony is
at least preferable to evaluating a poll by measuring its results against a judge's own 'knowl-
edge' of public opinion or of polling techniques." (footnotes omitted)).
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fled at trial."15 7 If the Anti-Monopoly 1l court had approached this sur-
vey evidence by looking at the criteria set out by the Nestle court, 58
rather than by engaging in a result-oriented approach, the result in the
opinion may not have been different, but a closer look at the language
of the questions in the THERMOS-type survey and the motivation sur-
vey may have revealed the manipulation problems discussed above."'
These problems go to the relevance of the survey results to the issues in
the case. In the absence of testimony that would have explained
whether the survey results were relevant to resolving the issues in the
case the court should have remanded for expert testimony on this point.
By failing to engage in any evaluation of the trustworthiness of the
survey evidence and by selectively scrutinizing the language of only the
brand-name survey to determine relevance, theAnti-Monopoly II court
introduced a great deal of confusion into the determination of "gener-
icness." In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp. ,6' the
Ninth Circuit cited Anti-Monopoly II for the proposition: "Surveys
conducted according to accepted principles are routinely admitted."' 6'
The lack of any indication in the Anti-Monopoly II opinion of what
those accepted principles might be highlights the absence of clear
guidelines in the Ninth Circuit for evaluating survey trustworthiness.
Future litigants will be less likely to engage in survey manipulation if
courts take on a greater role in ensuring the basic trustworthiness of
surveys before they are introduced into evidence by setting out clear
guidelines by which trustworthiness will be evaluated.
3. The genus definition
The Anti-Monopoly I court suggested that "MONOPOLY may
constitute its own genus."'16 z This approach to determining "generic-
ness" refers to whether a trademark has come to represent a genus,
such as chess games, or a species, such as a particular manufacturer's
157. Id. at 1324.
158. See supra text accompanying note 145.
159. See supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text.
160. 694 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1982).
161. Id. at 1156. The court also stated that: "Technical unreliability goes to the weight
accorded a survey, not its admissibility." Id. (citing C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1055 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1981)). The Ninth Circuit is apparently
liberal in admitting survey evidence, although what minimum level of acceptability is re-
quired is not clear. While the survey evidence admitted inAnti-Monopoly might have been
acceptable, it Was not acquired by the most preferred methods because the questions were
constructed by the parties and no worthwhile expert testimony was available on the trust-
worthiness of the polling techniques. See supra notes 11I, 113 and accompanying text.
162. 611 F.2d at 305.
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chess game, e.g., EN PASSANT. 63 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
the existence of the broad classifier "chess" permits the inference that a
consumer using the term EN PASSANT is using it as a valid trade-
mark because EN PASSANT differs from other chess games in only
source-related ways.'" If EN PASSANT, however, has different rules
from other chess games and therefore is a unique product, this infer-
ence would collapse; the consumer in that situation might then use the
term EN PASSANT to make source-irrelevant distinctions.
65
The Anti-Monopoly I court also suggested the cross elasticity of
demand theory, used in antitrust for market definition, as a way of de-
fining a genus. 66 Under this approach, a genus would be comprised of
products that are "reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purpose,' ' 67 reasonable interchangeability being measured by
consumer use, product quality and price. 168  Genus members, then,
compete for the same customers. The court viewed either of these ap-
proaches as valid to determine genus as long as the focus is on con-
sumer understanding.1
69
163. Id. at 302-04. The Ninth Circuit used these examples of a genus and a species in its
analysis. Id. at 303.
164. Id. See supra note 52.
165. 611 F.2d at 303. See supra note 52. Not all courts considering unique product trade-
marks have been concerned with this possibility. In Selchow & Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 198 U.S.P.Q. 557, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court found SCRABBLE had not
"become a term referring to all word games," though "Scrabble" is arguably unique from
other word games.
166. 611 F.2d at 303 n.4. This was first suggested by Professor McCarthy, 1 J. MCCAR-
THY, supra note 22, § 12:7, based on the definition of cross-elasticity of demand from United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 403-04 (1956) (Court held that flexi-
ble packaging materials is the relevant market for determining the extent of market control
rather than cellophane alone).
167. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 395.
168. Id. at 396.
169. 611 F.2d at 303 n.4. The United States Supreme Court in considering cross elasticity
of demand as a way of defining a relevant product market stated:
An element for consideration as to cross-elasticity of demand between prod-
ucts is the responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the other.
If a slight decrease in the price of cellophane causes a considerable number of
customers of other flexible wrappings to switch to cellophane, it would be an indi-
cation that a high cross-elasticity of demand exists between them; that the products
compete in the same market.
351 U.S. at 400 (footnote omitted). Presumably, theAnti-Monopol I court would agree that
an economic analysis of consumer reaction to price changes is an analysis focused on con-
sumer understanding.
Interestingly, cellophane was invalidated as a trademark in 1936 primarily because of
"generic" use by the manufacturer in advertising. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods.
Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936). The Second Circuit there men-
tioned that cellophane had become the only word to describe the particular flexible, trans-
parent cellulose product, but no specific genus determination was made. 85 F.2d at 79-80.
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The importance of properly defining the genus becomes clear
when the context in which the Ninth Circuit will reject brand-name
surveys is examined. The Ninth Circuit rejected the brand-name sur-
vey in Anti-Monopoly II because "Monopoly" is made by only one
company. 7° In Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc.,171 decided by the
Ninth Circuit three months after its Anti-Monopoly I1 decision, the
panel determined that COKE was not "generic." In so doing, the Coca-
Cola court cited favorably the results of a brand-name survey in El.
duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida International, Inc. ,172 where the
court adopted a brand-name survey as trustworthy in finding that the
trademark TEFLON was not "generic." No distinction was made by
the Ninth Circuit between "Monopoly" and "Coke" and, therefore, a
rationale has not been expressed for rejecting brand-name surveys in
one situation but not the other. Although "Coke" is also made by only
one company, an argument could be made that it has more direct com-
petitors than the game "Monopoly." Colas made by competitors have
different formulas but they have virtually the same taste.173 Thus, re-
jection by the Ninth Circuit of brand-name surveys appears to be lim-
ited to cases in which a unique product made by ony one company is
involved where the trademark may have become the "generic" term for
that unique product genus. Why a brand-name survey should be re-
jected in this situation is not clear. A unique product need not neces-
sarily be made by only one company 174 and the fact that a product is in
fact made by only one company should not invalidate a brand-name
survey designed to determine whether a consumer understands this to
be the case.
The Ninth Circuit did more than simply presume it was dealing
with a unique product in An-Monopoly II; it applied survey results
which were particularly burdensome on the manufacturer of the
unique product as it was defined. First, it concurred in the results of
170. 684 F.2d at 1323. See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
171. 692 F.2d 1250, 1254 & n.l 1 (9th Cir. 1982). One of the judges on the Coca-Cola
panel, Judge Wallace, wrote the court's opinion in Ant-Monopoly I. This suggests an
awareness, on his part at least, of the rejection of the brand-name survey in And-Monopoly
II.
172. 393 F. Supp. 502, 526 n.54 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). COKE, included in the TEFLON
brand-name survey as a control, was recognized by 76% of the people sampled as a brand
name. 692 F.2d at 1254 n.ll.
173. As noted by the Court in Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. at 146: "Coca-Cola
probably means to most persons the plaintiff's familiar product, to be had everywhere,
rather than a compound of particular substances."
174. See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982), where
the unique product "Rubik's Cube" was being made by two manufacturers.
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the THERMOS-type survey which asked consumers to come up with a
name to fit a very detailed description of a game for which no "ge-
neric" term or competitor's term existed. 75 Then, it validated the re-
sults of the motivation survey which asked consumers to make product
comparisons where only one manufacturer's product existed. 176 In-
stead of inquiring whether consumers perceived "Monopoly" as its
own genus, these surveys presumed that "Monopoly" was its own ge-
nus. The Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monopoly I reversed the district court
findings because it had presumed the relevant genus to be all real estate
trading games. The Ninth Circuit proposed a "genericness" test
designed to avoid such genus presumptions. 7 7 Yet, in Anti-Monopoly
II the Ninth Circuit proceeded to apply survey evidence that presumed
the relevant genus was the game "Monopoly." To fairly approach the
"genericness" issue, the Ninth Circuit should have either addressed the
determination of the relevant genus directly or adopted the brand-
name survey. The brand-name survey would have determined con-
sumer understanding without incorporating genus presumptions be-
cause it allowed respondents to choose whether the term designated a
genus or a species.
17 8
With so much riding on the definition of the "Monopoly" genus,
the Ninth Circuit did not discuss directly how it determined that "Mo-
nopoly" was in a genus by itself.'7 9 The motivation survey showed that
92% of people polled recognized "Monopoly" as the business board
game produced by Parker Brothers, while the THERMOS-type survey
revealed that only 80% of 53%, or 42%, recognized "Monopoly" as a
business board game in which players buy, sell, mortgage and trade
city streets, utilities and railroads, build houses, collect rents and win
by bankrupting all the other players. 80 These results indicate that a
majority of consumers would lump "Monopoly" together with other
business board games, not that consumers would view it as its own ge-
nus. Likewise, the results of the brand-name survey indicate 63% of
consumers would liken MONOPOLY to the species designation
CHEVROLET. If the Ninth Circuit had required a direct showing of
175. See supra notes 56, 136-38 and accompanying text.
176. The district court made a strong argument along these lines. See supra notes 52-53
and accompanying text. See also Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Value of Trade-
Marks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 176-77 (1949).
177. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. See also Zeisel, supra note 5, at 902.
179. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
180. 684 F.2d at 1323-24.
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the relevant genus, expert testimony might have been able to provide
that showing by using the survey evidence already collected.
A unique product made by only one company, which would trig-
ger the Ninth Circuit survey analysis of Anti-Monopoly II, most often
occurs when a patent expires on the product with which a trademark
has been associated.'' A trademark should not be used to unlawfully
extend the life of the patent." 2 In Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June
Manufacturing Co. ,"'3 the Supreme Court stated:
It equally follows from the cessation of the monopoly and the
falling of the patented device into the domain of things pub-
lic, that along with the public ownership of the device there
must also necessarily pass to the public the generic designa-
tion of the thing which has arisen during the monopoly
184
Thus, it is still "genericness" which must be determined. Only when a
trademark becomes the "generic" description for an item is a competi-
tor unable to communicate to the buyer what it is he or she is selling.1
8 5
InAnti-Monopo)' I the Ninth Circuit enumerated the policies un-
derlying trademark law:
(1) to protect consumers from being misled as to the enter-
prise, or enterprises, from which the goods or services ema-
nate or with which they are associated;
(2) to prevent an impairment of the value of the enterprise
which owns the trademark; and
(3) to achieve these ends in a manner consistent with the
objectives of free competition.1
8 6
The first two policy bases are traditionally associated with the goals of
the trademark system; 8 7 the last is more an antitrust limitation on the
trademark system.18 8
181. See 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, § 18.27; 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 2.02(3); 1 J.
MCCARTHY, supra note 22, § 12:17; E. VANDENBURGH, supra note 22, § 9.30.
182. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-18 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 184-86 (1896).
183. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
184. Id. at 185.
185. Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190, 194-95
(9th Cir. 1953); Zivin, supra note 33, at 188.
186. 611 F.2d at 300-01 (quoting HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th
Cir. 1974)).
187. See 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, § 17.01; 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 1.03.
188. 504 F.2d at 716. Several commentators have disputed the need for an express anti-
trust limitation on the trademark system. See Diamond, supra note 70, at 532-37 ("It is a
paradox that trademarks should be attacked as anticompetitive when their basic purpose is
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Because the court clearly was concerned with what it viewed as a
lack of competitors in the "Monopoly" market, a better direct approach
to determining the relevant genus would have been to borrow the cross
elasticity of demand theory of antitrust law to define the product ge-
nus,189 especially since normal genus/species distinctions blur in a
unique product situation. The court then should have required Anti-
Monopoly to show that under this definition "Monopoly" was indeed
perceived as its own genus. Only if the specific game "Monopoly" was
the genus would a THERMOS-type survey, designed to determine
what term consumers use to refer to this genus, validly determine that
consumers used MONOPOLY to refer to a genus. If the court had
taken this approach, it need not have considered the motivation survey,
which is of dubious value in providing information on consumer un-
derstanding of a term. 19°
B. Alternate Remedies
1. Introduction
If all the survey evidence before the Ninth Circuit in Anti-Monop-
oly II had been accepted as trustworthy and not partially rejected, as
the Ninth Circuit rejected the brand-name survey' 9' and as the district
court rejected the THERMOS-type survey and the motivation sur-
vey,192 the Ninth Circuit could have advanced a better interpretation of
the function of the term MONOPOLY in relation to the unique prod-
uct genus it had defined. There are three possible ways the term for a
product can function: (1) as a valid trademark indicating the source of
the product to which it is attached, whether it be "some indication" or
to facilitate the operation of the competitive process."); Oppenheim, The Public Interest in
Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property, 40 TRADE-MARK REP. 613, 625-26
(1950) ("The fact that trade-marks may be a part of contracts, combinations or conspiracies,
or similar arrangements, in violation of the anti-trust laws is insufficient ground for creating
the impression that trade-marks are inherently an anti-trust problem." (footnote omitted));
Pattishall, supra note 91, at 968-70 ("[T]o affirm and further the doctrines of the anti-trust
acts, but to inhibit the protection of trade-marks and other means for commercial identifica-
tion, is patently contradictory.").
189. The cross elasticity of demand approach would also eliminate the inconsistency of
an action for "genericness" brought by a company arguing that it is being unfairly kept out
of a market that it is not in because its product is in a different genus. In the pending
antitrust action Anti-Monopoly brought against Parker-Brothers, see Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v.
General Mills, Inc., 684 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1982), Anti-Monopoly asserts the monopoliza-
tion of the business of making and distributing certain games. Such an allegation tends to
show that Anti-Monopoly would consider its game to be in the same market as "Monopoly."
190. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
191. 684 F.2d at 1323.
192. 515 F. Supp. at 453-54.
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the "primary indication," depending on the basic test applied;1 93 (2) as
the name of a product which is perceived by consumers as coming from
one source; or (3) as the name of a product.
A brand-name survey reveals that a certain amount of source indi-
cation exists.1 94 It does not reveal whether the reason for this indica-
tion is the term for the unique product or the unique product itself. A
THERMOS-type survey and a motivation survey tend to show whether
the unique qualities of the product itself accomplish a large measure of
source indication. In the case of a unique product such as "Monop-
oly," therefore, one could argue that a court could interpret the term
MONOPOLY to fall into the second possible function noted above-
the name of a game perceived as coming from one source-based on
the specific results of the survey evidence.
While a term falling into this second category may be technically
invalid as a trademark, especially under the more burdensome basic
"genericness" test used by the Ninth Circuit,195 it would be more equi-
table to apply a more lenient remedy than invalidation of the trade-
mark, as will be discussed below. 196 Whatever the ultimate remedy,
however, all the survey evidence should be analyzed on an equal foot-
ing. All survey evidence should be screened initially for trustworthi-
ness by requiring foundation evidence by experts on the criteria set out
by the Nestle court. 197 Once determined trustworthy, further expert
testimony on the relevance of a survey to the issues in the case should
be carefully considered.' 98 Survey evidence can provide valuable in-
sight into consumers' use of a trademark.'99 Under this approach
courts will face situations in which they will have to make difficult
choices between equally trustworthy survey evidence. The Anti-Mo-
nopoly II total rejection of the brand-name survey, however, obscured
the fact that something was providing consumers with source
indication.
One function of trademarks recognized by the Ninth Circuit is the
protection of the good will a manufacturer has built up in its product-
193. See supra notes 82-83, 87-90 and accompanying text.
194. Parker Brothers was correctly identified as the manufacturer of "Monopoly" by 55%
of the people polled.
195. See supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text. The demarcation between these
possible functions is not complete because both the game and the trademark could be con-
tributing to the source indication. Where source indication occurs, a more burdensome ba-
sic test treats more terms as fulfilling the second possible function.
196. See infra notes 207-39 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 113-16, 146-48 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 110, 112 and accompanying text.
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through quality control and advertising-which allows a buyer to dis-
tinguish it from other available products.2" The Supreme Court recog-
nized this function in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co.
v. S.S. Kresge Co. ,20 where it stated:
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a
purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to
believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human
propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmos-
phere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial
symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the
same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it
appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has
something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial
magentism of the symbol he [the owner] has created, the
owner can obtain legal redress. 20 2
In addition, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that in fulfilling the
goals of guaranteeing consistent quality20 3 and of distinguishing among
manufacturers, trademarks benefit the public by preventing confusion
and deception.2°4 This function is seen in the Lanham Trademark
Act2°5 requirement that there be "likelihood of confusion" in the con-
sumer's mind before a court may grant remedies for trademark
infringement.2 °6
MONOPOLY is a term that has become the name of a game con-
200. 611 F.2d at 300-01; HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir.
1974); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 & n.13 (9th Cir. 1968).
201. 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
202. Id. at 205.
203. A trademark owner risks abandonment of his mark if quality control is not exercised
in licensing the mark because the mark "may be used legitimately [only] by related compa-
nies." 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976). See 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, § 19.50; 1 J. GILSON,
supra note 5, § 6.01(4)-(6).
204. See supra note 200.
205. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
206. Infringement is defined at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976). As the Seventh Circuit has
stated:
In the consideration of evidence relating to trademark infringement, therefore, a
court must expand the more frequent, one-on-one, contest-between-two sides, ap-
proach. A third party, the consuming public, is present and its interests are para-
mount. Hence infringement is found when the evidence indicates a likelihood of
confusion, deception or mistake on the part of the consuming public.
James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976). Ex-
panding on this, the court continued: "A 'trademark' is not that which is infringed. What is
infringed is the right of the public to be free of confusion and the synonymous right of a
trademark owner to control his product's reputation." Id.
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sumers recognize as coming from one manufacturer. As such, the term
functions to protect the good will Parker Brothers has built up in the
game and to prevent confusion and deception of the public. Because of
MONOPOLY's continuing viability in performing these functions, a
remedy less severe than the invalidation imposed by the Ninth Circuit
seems more equitable, particularly in light of the Ninth Circuit's recog-
nition in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc. of the shift of the primary func-
tion of a trademark from source indication to quality guarantee2°7 and
the difficulty in distinguishing source-related from source-irrelevant
qualities in a game whose goal is entertainment. Two possible reme-
dies, comparative advertising and compulsory licensing, will be consid-
ered here.
2. Comparative advertising
The Ninth Circuit in Smith v. Chanel, Inc. 208 held that the appel-
lant could advertise that his perfume "duplicatefs] 100% perfect the ex-
act scent of" Chanel No. 5, as long as the claim was truthful and did
not confuse the public as to the source of the perfume.2 °9 Under these
conditions the court held the appellant would not be interfering with
the only legally protectable function of a trademark--"to impart infor-
mation as to the source or sponsorship of the product. ' 210 This deci-
sion, likeAnti-Monopoly II, was based on preventing a trademark from
becoming "a barrier to the entry of new competition into the mar-
ket."21' The Ninth Circuit in itsAnti-Monopoly I decision cited Chanel
for the proposition that: "Trademarks . . .are not properly used as
patent substitutes to further or perpetuate product monopolies. 21 2
Given its reliance on the reasoning of Chanel, the Ninth Circuit should
have considered the effectiveness of comparative advertising, which
Anti-Monopoly could have used to break down barriers to
competition.21 3
207. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
208. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
209. Id. at 569. On remand the district court found the claim to be untruthful and the
resulting injunction was affirmed on appeal. Chanel, Inc. v. Smith, 528 F.2d 284, 285 (9th
Cir. 1976). See also Societe Comptoir de l'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v.
Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962) (defendant allowed to use plain-
tifts trademarks DIOR and CHRISTIAN DIOR to promote sale of its garments as copies).
210. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d at 566 (footnote omitted).
211. Id. at 567.
212. 611 F.2d at 300 (citing Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d at 566-69).
213. See Swam, supra note 97, at 373 ("marketing methods will expose consumers to
competitive items, thereby diluting generic conceptions"). But see Folsom & Teply, supra
note 103, at 229 (competitors will avoid comparative advertising because others may get a
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A company wishing to compete with "Monopoly" could use com-
parative advertising to indicate that its game is merely the same game
by a different manufacturer. Since the public already realizes that the
game "Monopoly" has a particular source, this advertising would im-
mediately relegate MONOPOLY to indicating that source. The court
could specify the type of comparative advertising the competitor could
employ to ensure the public would not be confused. In addition, to aid
further entry into the market, the court could devise a more acceptable
"generic" term and require advertising aimed at alerting the public to
the "generic" term and its placement on the game cartons.2t 4
The final judgment of the district court in.Anti-Monopoly, after the
second remand by the Ninth Circuit, incorporated similar techniques to
prevent consumer deception. In addition to other restrictions, 21 5 Anti-
Monopoly must for the next five years follow any use of the name
ANTI-MONOPOLY on labeling, packaging, advertising or promo-
tional material with the statement: "This game is not licensed or pro-
duced by Parker Brothers, the producers of MONOPOLY game
equipment. '216 Similarly, in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. New York Air
Lines, Inc. ,217 the court found AIR-SHUTTLE "generic" but enjoined
use of the term "shuttle" by New York Air Lines in advertising because
it was used in a misleading way.21s These orders acknowledged the
importance of avoiding public deception and the role trademarks can
play in that avoidance.2 19 In Eastern, survey evidence showed that
only 10% of the people polled connected AIR-SHUTTLE with Eastern
free-ride on the resultant consumer education and because of fear of retaliation by the trade-
mark owner). See generally Robin, Advertising and the Law: How Far Does Protection Ex-
tend, 64 TRADE-MARK REP. 173 (1974).
214. A good example of an acceptable "generic" name is polyester, which DuPont
adopted as the "generic" name for its DACRON material. Zivin, supra note 33, at 194.
215. Anti-Monopoly may use its corporate name only in connection with the manufactur-
ing, marketing or sale of the game "Anti-Monopoly" and may not use, in any prominent
manner, the words "Monopoly," "Monopolist" or "Monopolistic" in advertising, offering or
selling game equipment. UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASS'N, 38 GENERAL NEws BULLE-
TIN 32 (1983).
216. Id.
217. 559 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
218. Id. at 1278-80. Eastern's "Air-Shuttle" service provided a guaranteed seat without a
reservation and a back-up airplane in reserve to make sure everybody would get a seat. Id.
at 1272. New York's "shuttle" service did not provide these features although their advertis-
ing led 47% of the surveyed individuals to believe it did. Id. at 1278-79.
219. Other courts have felt compelled to structure their orders to prevent deception of
consumers still recognizing the trademark function of a term, e.g., American Thermos
Prods. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. at 27, or to deny relief altogether if the
possibility of some deception remained real, e.g., Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. at
270. See Swann, supra note 106, at 246-47; Treece & Stephenson, supra note 37, at 467-68.
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Air Lines so that even the product did not have source indication.22 0
Under these circumstances invalidation coupled with an injunction to
prevent public deception is probably a fair approach. In the Anti-Mo-
nopoly situation, however, a less drastic remedy would similarly pre-
vent public deception and effect a hasty "recapture" of the
trademark. 2 1
In Ideal Toy Corp. v Plawner Toy Manufacturing Corp. ,222 the
Third Circuit tried to determine whether the trade dress of Ideal's
RUBIK'S CUBE, the color of the faces and the solid color on each side
start position, had achieved secondary meaning as an indication of
220. 559 F. Supp. at 1275.
221. Another problem with labeling a trademark "generic" and invalidating it, is the view
expressed by some courts that "even proof of secondary meaning, by virtue of which some
'merely descriptive' marks may be registered, cannot transform a generic term into a subject
for trademark." Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976). For this reason, commentators have developed the term "de facto secondary mean-
ing" to refer to the secondary meaning a "generic" term develops. See 1 J. GILSON, supra
note 5, § 2.09(2); 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, §§ 12:15 & 15:7; Treece & Stephenson,
supra note 37, at 457-60. See also Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Sur-
geries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1979) (possible that term "Surgicenter" was "generic"
and therefore not registrable as a trademark even with a showing of secondary meaning);
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977) (term "light"
or its phonetic equivalent "lite" held to be "generic" as applied to lower calorie beer and
incapable of appropriation as a trademark), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); CES Publish-
ing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1975) (term "Consumer Elec-
tronics" "generic" as the title of a trade magazine and not subject to trademark protection);
In re Chesapeake Corp. of Va., 420 F.2d 754 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (term "Superwaterfinish" as
applied to Kraft paper not so highly descriptive as to be incapable of registration as a trade-
mark); American Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.)
(term "Alo" as applied to cosmetics is "generic" and cannot be appropriated as a trade-
mark), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970); Cummins Engine Co. v. Continental Motors Corp.,
359 F.2d 892 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (trademark TURBODIESEL cancelled despite money spent
promoting it because it is naturally and adequately nominative of engine type); Weiss Noo-
dle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (trademark HA-
LUSH-KA cancelled for egg noodles as phonetic version of the Hungarian word for that
product despite acquired secondary meaning); J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280
F.2d 437 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (term "Matchbox" not registrable even with showing of secondary
meaning as it is common descriptive term for toys packaged in small boxes); Rohr Aircraft
Corp. v. Rubber Teck, Inc., 266 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1959) ("generic" term "Seal" not capable
of appropriation as a trademark). If strictly followed for former trademarks, this de facto
secondary meaning theory seems particularly harsh in light of the history of marks being
"recaptured" from the public domain. See 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 2.02(6). In fact, the
trademark SINGER found "generic" in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169
(1896), was held to have regained validity in Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519 (5th
Cir. 1953). Professor Callman has called this theory "ill-considered" and suggests that "the
better view is that secondary meaning is purely a question of fact to be decided indepen-
dently in each case." 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, §§ 18.03 & 19.27.
222. 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982).
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source. 223 The court considered the following evidence from the trial
transcript:
THE COURT: If someone went into a store and said to
the store owner, "give me Rubik's Cube," and they handed
them the defendant's product, is there any question in your
mind that the customer would think that he was getting what
he asked for?
COUNSEL FOR PLAWNER: No question in my
mind.224
While this exchange shows likelihood of confusion, it also tends to
show that buyer motivation is product-related. This illustrates that the
same evidence which can show a product's trademark is "generic" even
though there is source indication might be interpreted as also showing
the product's configuration has acquired secondary meaning. If people
use MONOPOLY to refer to a particular product but they also realize
that the game comes from a single source, it might be that the trade
dress of the game (Atlantic City street names, the colors of the proper-
ties, or the markers used by the players) is indicating source.2 25 Al-
though one court has observed that "no matter how much money and
effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of
its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public
identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the prod-
uct of the right to call an article by its name. 226 Money spent on pro-
motion has been considered in determining secondary meaning for
trade dress.227 Whether it is by analogy to trade dress cases228 or the
223. Id. at 82-83. See supra note 37.
224. Id. at 82.
225. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (applicant not
precluded from obtaining trademark registration covering decanter configuration during life
of design patent on that configuration as long as evidence showed the design functioned as a
trademark); Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3 (6th Cir. 1957) (relief
granted for simulation of arrangement and design of printing and ornamentation on nut
packages which had acquired secondary meaning); Oriental Foods, Inc. v. Chun King Sales,
Inc., 244 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1957) (no relief granted for partial similarity in packaging with-
out showing that similarity would mislead or confuse an appreciable number of prospective
purchasers); Coca-Cola Co. v. Glee-Nol Bottling Co., 221 F. 61 (5th Cir. 1915) (no relief
granted for simulation of bottle and lettering appearance where they had not acquired sec-
ondary meaning); Charles E. Hires Co. v. Consumers' Co., 100 F. 809 (7th Cir. 1900) (in-
junctive relief granted for intentional imitation of new and peculiar form of bottle which
had acquired secondary meaning). See generally 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, §§ 18.12 &
19.38; 1 J. GILSON, supra note 5, § 2.12; 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, §§ 7:23-7:33 & 8:1-
8:8; E. VANDENBURGH, supra note 22, § 1.21(b).
226. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d at 9 (citing J. Kohnstam,
Ltd. v. Louis Marx & Co., 280 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1960)).
227. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d at 82.
228. See supra note 225.
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recognition that the name for a unique product is easily "recaptured"
from "generic" status, 229 courts should apply remedies which account
for all the functions of a trademark.23 ° This is particularly true when
invalidation affects not only the trademark owner but the public as
well.
3. Compulsory licensing
In Anti-Monopoly, the Ninth Circuit used a finding of "generic-
ness" to impose an antitrust limitation on the trademark system.23'
Earlier, it was suggested that this should compel the court to borrow
from antitrust law in defining the genus for a product.232 The court
also should consider remedies suggested in antitrust cases to "effec-
tively pry open to competition a market that has been closed. ' 233 This
consideration of a broader range of remedies will allow the court to
choose the "least drastic" alternative remedy for the facts of the case.234
Unfortunately, the use of compulsory trademark relief has been
sparse in the antitrust area.235 Temporary injunctions against use of a
trademark have been imposed,236 and the Federal Trade Commission
has suggested it would order compulsory licensing in an appropriate
case.2 37 While the Federal Trade Commission was considering a roy-
alty-free compulsory license, the less drastic remedy of a reasonable-
royalty compulsory license might be effective in the unique product sit-
uation. Licensed use of the mark would allow competitive entry into
the market and the reasonable royalty would allow the trademark
owner to recoup promotional expenses. Provision would have to be
made, however, for quality control and product distinguishment to
avoid deceiving consumers.238 Care would also have to be taken to
ensure that further "generic" use of the mark is not promoted. Prop-
229. See supra note 221.
230. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.
233. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
234. See Diamond, supra note 70, at 537-38; Holmes, Compulsory Patent and Trademark
Licensing: A Framework/or Analysis, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 43, 44-46 (1980).
235. Holmes, supra note 234, at 66.
236. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); United States v.
General Electric Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
237. In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978).
238. In Manhattan Indus., Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir.
1980), the court held that both parties would be allowed to use the "Kimberly" mark re-
cently abandoned by General Mills and stated: "No doubt the parties can create and pres-
ent to the district court sufficiently distinct labels bearing the 'Kimberly' mark so that the
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erly effected, compulsory licensing is a less drastic alternative to the
loss, which accompanies invalidation, of the right to protect a trade-
mark from infringement.239
VI. CONCLUSION
The two Ninth Circuit Anti-Monopoly decisions set a dangerous
precedent for subsequent decisions on "genericness." In using a test for
secondary meaning as the basic test for "genericness," the court contin-
ued the trend away from tests giving greater protection to registered
trademarks. This shift fails to consider the different equities involved
in determinations of secondary meaning and "genericness" of a regis-
tered trademark. The motivation survey accepted by the Ninth Circuit
provides largely irrelevant information and, absent stricter standards of
trustworthiness, seems particularly prone to manipulation by the party
conducting the survey. The Ninth Circuit should have required a
showing that "Monopoly" was indeed perceived by consumers as its
own genus before rejecting the brand-name survey and allowing the
THERMOS-type survey to take a unique product form.
Even assuming "Monopoly" is its own genus, the Ninth Circuit
should have recognized that the brand-name survey evidence of source
indication would allow application of a remedy less drastic than invali-
dation. Such a remedy could prevent consumer confusion as well as
forfeiture of the trademark owner's rights without stifling fair competi-
tion. In particular, court-regulated comparative advertising or compul-
sory licensing coupled with designation of an acceptable "generic"
term would protect the public and the trademark owner while allowing
competitor entry into the market.
Thomas J Daly*
purchasers of high quality women's clothing can distinguish appellees' 'Kimberly' goods
from appellant's." See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 221.
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